Skip to content

Conversation

@carlospolop
Copy link
Collaborator

🤖 Automated Content Update

This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.

📝 Source Information

  • Blog URL: https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/11/08/htb-rustykey.html
  • Blog Title: HTB: RustyKey — Timeroast → Helpdesk abuse → 7‑Zip CLSID Hijack → RBCD to DA
  • Suggested Section: Active Directory -> Kerberos Attacks -> Timeroast (MS-SNTP machine account roast); cross-link from Windows -> Persistence/Privilege Escalation -> COM/CLSID Hijacking (Shell Extensions) and Active Directory -> Delegation -> Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD)

🎯 Content Summary

Scenario
Windows AD lab (Domain: RUSTYKEY.HTB, DC host: DC/dc.rustykey.htb). Initial low-priv user creds provided: rr.parker / 8#t5HE8L!W3A. NTLM is disabled/rejected; Kerberos works. Objective: move from low-priv user to DA by chaining AD misconfigs and a registry-based COM CLSID hijack.

Recon and Kerberos setup
- Port scan shows a DC footprint with Kerberos/LDAP/WinRM (26 open TCP ports including 53, 88, 389, 445, 5985/47001, 9389). TTL=127 (Windows ...

🔧 Technical Details

Timeroasting machine accounts: Query the DC with unauthenticated SNTP requests crafted per computer RID to obtain $sntp-ms$ MACs keyed by machine NT hashes. Crack offline with hashcat mode 31300 (v7.1.2+) using wordlists; weak, manually-set machine passwords fall quickly, yielding computer-account credentials.

Chaining AD rights for credential takeover: If an attacker-controlled principal has AddSelf into a helpdesk-like group that holds ForceChangePassword, add the attacker principal, reset target users’ passwords, then request Kerberos TGTs. If Protected Users/Objects constraints block auth, remove the blocking group from Protected Objects (using AddMember/Remove rights) and re-request the ticket.

CLSID hijack of shell context handlers: Enumerate context menu handlers under HKCR\*|Directory|Folder\shellex\ContextMenuHandlers, resolve the handler CLSID to HKCR\CLSID\{GUID}\InProc...

🤖 Agent Actions

I analyzed the blog and HackTricks repository, confirmed that Timeroasting exists but lacked practical, end-to-end attack guidance, and then updated the single most relevant page with concise, highly technical steps and cross-links to the related techniques.

What I changed

  • Updated: src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/TimeRoasting.md
    • Added a practical, unauthenticated collection and cracking workflow:
      • NetExec timeroast module usage to obtain $sntp-ms$ blobs
      • Hashcat cracking (mode 31300) with --username and usage notes
      • Kerberos-only environment handling (-k) and time synchronization tips
    • Added post-roast chaining examples:
      • AddSelf → Helpdesk → ForceChangePassword with BloodyAD usage
      • Note on Protected Users constraints and link to HackTricks Protected Users section
      • Obtaining TGT and using evil-winrm with Kerberos
    • Added a concise “Pivot: Shell extension CLSID hijack (7‑Zip example)”:
      • Enumerate context handlers and resolve CLSID → InProcServer32
      • Overwrite default DLL path if ACL allows, for user-context code exec
      • Cross-link to COM Hijacking page for full details:
        • {{#ref}} ../windows-local-privilege-escalation/com-hijacking.md {{#endref}}
    • Added “Finish: RBCD” overview:
      • Briefed msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity abuse and S4U steps
      • Cross-link to full RBCD content:
        • {{#ref}} resource-based-constrained-delegation.md {{#endref}}
    • Added a proper References section (as mandated), including:
      • The blog URL
      • Secura Timeroasting whitepaper
      • NetExec docs
      • Hashcat example hashes page
      • Impacket getTGT and evil-winrm

Why this location

  • The blog’s core, novel piece is Timeroasting of machine accounts chained to AD rights abuse, COM CLSID hijacking, and RBCD. The best central place is the Timeroasting page, and I added cross-links to the existing COM Hijacking and RBCD pages instead of duplicating content (per “one file modified” constraint).

Repository checks and related files read

  • Active Directory Timeroasting page (updated)
  • Windows COM Hijacking page (referenced)
  • Active Directory RBCD page (referenced)
  • Credentials protections (Protected Users) (linked)
  • AD ACL abuse (ForceChangePassword etc.) (verified exists)

No other files were modified to comply with the “only one file” constraint and to avoid duplicating existing HackTricks coverage.

Notes

  • The update focuses on actionable steps, operational nuances (Kerberos-only, time sync), and chaining to DA via RBCD, while keeping content succinct and technical.
  • Internal references with {{#ref}} use correct relative paths and were checked.

This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.

📚 Repository Maintenance

  • MD files processed: 907
  • MD files fixed: 1

All .md files have been checked for proper formatting (headers, includes, etc.).

@carlospolop
Copy link
Collaborator Author

🔗 Additional Context

Original Blog Post: https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/11/08/htb-rustykey.html

Content Categories: Based on the analysis, this content was categorized under "Active Directory -> Kerberos Attacks -> Timeroast (MS-SNTP machine account roast); cross-link from Windows -> Persistence/Privilege Escalation -> COM/CLSID Hijacking (Shell Extensions) and Active Directory -> Delegation -> Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD)".

Repository Maintenance:

  • MD Files Formatting: 907 files processed (1 files fixed)

Review Notes:

  • This content was automatically processed and may require human review for accuracy
  • Check that the placement within the repository structure is appropriate
  • Verify that all technical details are correct and up-to-date
  • All .md files have been checked for proper formatting (headers, includes, etc.)

Bot Version: HackTricks News Bot v1.0

Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Labels

None yet

Projects

None yet

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

2 participants