HTB RustyKey — Timeroast → Helpdesk abuse → 7‑Zip CLSID Hija... #1562
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🤖 Automated Content Update
This PR was automatically generated by the HackTricks News Bot based on a technical blog post.
📝 Source Information
🎯 Content Summary
Scenario
Windows AD lab (Domain: RUSTYKEY.HTB, DC host: DC/dc.rustykey.htb). Initial low-priv user creds provided:
rr.parker / 8#t5HE8L!W3A. NTLM is disabled/rejected; Kerberos works. Objective: move from low-priv user to DA by chaining AD misconfigs and a registry-based COM CLSID hijack.Recon and Kerberos setup
- Port scan shows a DC footprint with Kerberos/LDAP/WinRM (26 open TCP ports including 53, 88, 389, 445, 5985/47001, 9389). TTL=127 (Windows ...
🔧 Technical Details
Timeroasting machine accounts: Query the DC with unauthenticated SNTP requests crafted per computer RID to obtain
$sntp-ms$MACs keyed by machine NT hashes. Crack offline with hashcat mode 31300 (v7.1.2+) using wordlists; weak, manually-set machine passwords fall quickly, yielding computer-account credentials.Chaining AD rights for credential takeover: If an attacker-controlled principal has
AddSelfinto a helpdesk-like group that holdsForceChangePassword, add the attacker principal, reset target users’ passwords, then request Kerberos TGTs. If Protected Users/Objects constraints block auth, remove the blocking group from Protected Objects (usingAddMember/Removerights) and re-request the ticket.CLSID hijack of shell context handlers: Enumerate context menu handlers under
HKCR\*|Directory|Folder\shellex\ContextMenuHandlers, resolve the handler CLSID toHKCR\CLSID\{GUID}\InProc...🤖 Agent ActionsI analyzed the blog and HackTricks repository, confirmed that Timeroasting exists but lacked practical, end-to-end attack guidance, and then updated the single most relevant page with concise, highly technical steps and cross-links to the related techniques.
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Notes
This PR was automatically created by the HackTricks Feed Bot. Please review the changes carefully before merging.
📚 Repository Maintenance
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