incorporate comments

Author: squell

src/sudo/pipeline/edit.rs

@@ -35,7 +35,8 @@ pub fn run_edit(edit_opts: SudoEditOptions) -> Result<(), Error> {
                 &context.target_group,
             ) {
                 Ok(file) => opened_files.push((path, file)),
-                Err(error) if error.raw_os_error() == Some(40) => {
+                // ErrorKind::FilesystemLoop was only stabilized in 1.83
+                Err(error) if error.raw_os_error() == Some(libc::ELOOP) => {
                     user_error!("{arg}: editing symbolic links is not permitted")
                 }
                 Err(error) => user_error!("error opening {arg}: {error}"),

test-framework/sudo-compliance-tests/src/sudoedit/limits.rs

@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ fn cannot_edit_writable_paths() {
             .arg(file)
             .output(&env);
 
+        output.assert_exit_code(1);
+
         if sudo_test::is_original_sudo() {
             if file != "/tmp/bar/foo.sh" {
                 assert_contains!(
@@ -36,14 +38,13 @@ fn cannot_edit_writable_paths() {
                 "cannot open a file in a path writable by the user"
             );
         }
-        output.assert_exit_code(1);
     }
 }
 
 #[test]
 fn can_edit_writable_paths_as_root() {
     // note: we already have tests that sudoedit "works" so we are skipping
-    // the content check here---the point here is that sudoedit does not stop
+    // the content check here: the point here is that sudoedit does not stop
     // the user.
 
     let env = Env(SUDOERS_ALL_ALL_NOPASSWD)
@@ -123,7 +124,7 @@ fn cannot_edit_files_target_user_cannot_access() {
 #[test]
 fn can_edit_files_target_user_or_group_can_access() {
     // note: we already have tests that sudoedit "works" so we are skipping
-    // the content check here---the point here is that sudoedit does not stop
+    // the content check here: the point here is that sudoedit does not stop
     // the user.
 
     let file = "/test.txt";