x86/sev: Do the C-bit verification only on the BSP

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-39439

commit 30579c8
Author: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Date:   Thu Nov 30 14:26:01 2023 +0100

    x86/sev: Do the C-bit verification only on the BSP

    There's no need to do it on every AP.

    The C-bit value read on the BSP and also verified there, is used
    everywhere from now on.

    No functional changes - just a bit faster booting APs.

    Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
    Acked-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130132601.10317-1-bp@alien8.de

Signed-off-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>

Author: whitebrandy

arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S

@@ -115,6 +115,28 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
 
 	/* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */
 	addq	$(early_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+	mov	%rax, %rdi
+	mov	%rax, %r14
+
+	addq	phys_base(%rip), %rdi
+
+	/*
+	 * For SEV guests: Verify that the C-bit is correct. A malicious
+	 * hypervisor could lie about the C-bit position to perform a ROP
+	 * attack on the guest by writing to the unencrypted stack and wait for
+	 * the next RET instruction.
+	 */
+	call	sev_verify_cbit
+
+	/*
+	 * Restore CR3 value without the phys_base which will be added
+	 * below, before writing %cr3.
+	 */
+	 mov	%r14, %rax
+#endif
+
 	jmp 1f
 SYM_CODE_END(startup_64)
 
@@ -193,15 +215,6 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	/* Setup early boot stage 4-/5-level pagetables. */
 	addq	phys_base(%rip), %rax
 
-	/*
-	 * For SEV guests: Verify that the C-bit is correct. A malicious
-	 * hypervisor could lie about the C-bit position to perform a ROP
-	 * attack on the guest by writing to the unencrypted stack and wait for
-	 * the next RET instruction.
-	 */
-	movq	%rax, %rdi
-	call	sev_verify_cbit
-
 	/*
 	 * Switch to new page-table
 	 *