Update README.md

Author: blperez01

denial_of_service/README.md

@@ -2,17 +2,18 @@
 
 A malicious contract can permanently stall another contract by failing
 in a strategic way. In particular, contracts that bulk perform transactions or updates using
-a `for` loop can be DoS'd if a call to another contract or `send` fails during the loop. 
+a `for` loop can be DoS'd if a call to another contract or `transfer` fails during the loop. 
 
 ## Attack Scenarios
 
 - Auction contract where frontrunner must be reimbursed when they are outbid. If the call refunding
-the frontrunner continuously fails, the auction is stalled and they become the de-facto winner.
+the frontrunner continuously fails, the auction is stalled and they become the de facto winner.
 
-- Contract iterates through an array to pay back its users. If one send fails in the middle of a `for` loop
+- Contract iterates through an array to pay back its users. If one `transfer` fails in the middle of a `for` loop
 all reimbursements fail.
 
-- Attacker forces calling contract to spend remainder of its gas and revert.
+- Attacker spams contract, causing some array to become large. Then `for` loops iterating through the array 
+might run out of gas and revert.
 
 ## Examples
 
@@ -30,4 +31,4 @@ using `while` loop that exists when gas drops below certain threshold.
 ## References
 
 - https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4ghzhv/governmentals_1100_eth_jackpot_payout_is_stuck/
-- https://github.com/ConsenSys/smart-contract-best-practices#dos-with-unexpected-revert
+- https://github.com/ConsenSys/smart-contract-best-practices#dos-with-unexpected-revert