Merge patch series "acct: don't allow access to internal filesystems"

Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> says:

In [1] it was reported that the acct(2) system call can be used to
trigger a NULL deref in cases where it is set to write to a file that
triggers an internal lookup.

This can e.g., happen when pointing acct(2) to /sys/power/resume. At the
point the where the write to this file happens the calling task has
already exited and called exit_fs() but an internal lookup might be
triggered through lookup_bdev(). This may trigger a NULL-deref
when accessing current->fs.

This series does two things:

- Reorganize the code so that the the final write happens from the
  workqueue but with the caller's credentials. This preserves the
  (strange) permission model and has almost no regression risk.

- Block access to kernel internal filesystems as well as procfs and
  sysfs in the first place.

This api should stop to exist imho.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250127091811.3183623-1-quzicheng@huawei.com [1]

* patches from https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250211-work-acct-v1-0-1c16aecab8b3@kernel.org:
  acct: block access to kernel internal filesystems
  acct: perform last write from workqueue

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250211-work-acct-v1-0-1c16aecab8b3@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>

Author: brauner

kernel/acct.c

@@ -103,48 +103,50 @@ struct bsd_acct_struct {
 	atomic_long_t		count;
 	struct rcu_head		rcu;
 	struct mutex		lock;
-	int			active;
+	bool			active;
+	bool			check_space;
 	unsigned long		needcheck;
 	struct file		*file;
 	struct pid_namespace	*ns;
 	struct work_struct	work;
 	struct completion	done;
+	acct_t			ac;
 };
 
-static void do_acct_process(struct bsd_acct_struct *acct);
+static void fill_ac(struct bsd_acct_struct *acct);
+static void acct_write_process(struct bsd_acct_struct *acct);
 
 /*
  * Check the amount of free space and suspend/resume accordingly.
  */
-static int check_free_space(struct bsd_acct_struct *acct)
+static bool check_free_space(struct bsd_acct_struct *acct)
 {
 	struct kstatfs sbuf;
 
-	if (time_is_after_jiffies(acct->needcheck))
-		goto out;
+	if (!acct->check_space)
+		return acct->active;
 
 	/* May block */
 	if (vfs_statfs(&acct->file->f_path, &sbuf))
-		goto out;
+		return acct->active;
 
 	if (acct->active) {
 		u64 suspend = sbuf.f_blocks * SUSPEND;
 		do_div(suspend, 100);
 		if (sbuf.f_bavail <= suspend) {
-			acct->active = 0;
+			acct->active = false;
 			pr_info("Process accounting paused\n");
 		}
 	} else {
 		u64 resume = sbuf.f_blocks * RESUME;
 		do_div(resume, 100);
 		if (sbuf.f_bavail >= resume) {
-			acct->active = 1;
+			acct->active = true;
 			pr_info("Process accounting resumed\n");
 		}
 	}
 
 	acct->needcheck = jiffies + ACCT_TIMEOUT*HZ;
-out:
 	return acct->active;
 }
 
@@ -189,7 +191,11 @@ static void acct_pin_kill(struct fs_pin *pin)
 {
 	struct bsd_acct_struct *acct = to_acct(pin);
 	mutex_lock(&acct->lock);
-	do_acct_process(acct);
+	/*
+	 * Fill the accounting struct with the exiting task's info
+	 * before punting to the workqueue.
+	 */
+	fill_ac(acct);
 	schedule_work(&acct->work);
 	wait_for_completion(&acct->done);
 	cmpxchg(&acct->ns->bacct, pin, NULL);
@@ -202,6 +208,9 @@ static void close_work(struct work_struct *work)
 {
 	struct bsd_acct_struct *acct = container_of(work, struct bsd_acct_struct, work);
 	struct file *file = acct->file;
+
+	/* We were fired by acct_pin_kill() which holds acct->lock. */
+	acct_write_process(acct);
 	if (file->f_op->flush)
 		file->f_op->flush(file, NULL);
 	__fput_sync(file);
@@ -234,6 +243,20 @@ static int acct_on(struct filename *pathname)
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 
+	/* Exclude kernel kernel internal filesystems. */
+	if (file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_flags & (SB_NOUSER | SB_KERNMOUNT)) {
+		kfree(acct);
+		filp_close(file, NULL);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Exclude procfs and sysfs. */
+	if (file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE) {
+		kfree(acct);
+		filp_close(file, NULL);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_CAN_WRITE)) {
 		kfree(acct);
 		filp_close(file, NULL);
@@ -430,13 +453,27 @@ static u32 encode_float(u64 value)
  *  do_exit() or when switching to a different output file.
  */
 
-static void fill_ac(acct_t *ac)
+static void fill_ac(struct bsd_acct_struct *acct)
 {
 	struct pacct_struct *pacct = &current->signal->pacct;
+	struct file *file = acct->file;
+	acct_t *ac = &acct->ac;
 	u64 elapsed, run_time;
 	time64_t btime;
 	struct tty_struct *tty;
 
+	lockdep_assert_held(&acct->lock);
+
+	if (time_is_after_jiffies(acct->needcheck)) {
+		acct->check_space = false;
+
+		/* Don't fill in @ac if nothing will be written. */
+		if (!acct->active)
+			return;
+	} else {
+		acct->check_space = true;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Fill the accounting struct with the needed info as recorded
 	 * by the different kernel functions.
@@ -484,64 +521,61 @@ static void fill_ac(acct_t *ac)
 	ac->ac_majflt = encode_comp_t(pacct->ac_majflt);
 	ac->ac_exitcode = pacct->ac_exitcode;
 	spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
-}
-/*
- *  do_acct_process does all actual work. Caller holds the reference to file.
- */
-static void do_acct_process(struct bsd_acct_struct *acct)
-{
-	acct_t ac;
-	unsigned long flim;
-	const struct cred *orig_cred;
-	struct file *file = acct->file;
 
-	/*
-	 * Accounting records are not subject to resource limits.
-	 */
-	flim = rlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE);
-	current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY;
-	/* Perform file operations on behalf of whoever enabled accounting */
-	orig_cred = override_creds(file->f_cred);
-
-	/*
-	 * First check to see if there is enough free_space to continue
-	 * the process accounting system.
-	 */
-	if (!check_free_space(acct))
-		goto out;
-
-	fill_ac(&ac);
 	/* we really need to bite the bullet and change layout */
-	ac.ac_uid = from_kuid_munged(file->f_cred->user_ns, orig_cred->uid);
-	ac.ac_gid = from_kgid_munged(file->f_cred->user_ns, orig_cred->gid);
+	ac->ac_uid = from_kuid_munged(file->f_cred->user_ns, current_uid());
+	ac->ac_gid = from_kgid_munged(file->f_cred->user_ns, current_gid());
 #if ACCT_VERSION == 1 || ACCT_VERSION == 2
 	/* backward-compatible 16 bit fields */
-	ac.ac_uid16 = ac.ac_uid;
-	ac.ac_gid16 = ac.ac_gid;
+	ac->ac_uid16 = ac->ac_uid;
+	ac->ac_gid16 = ac->ac_gid;
 #elif ACCT_VERSION == 3
 	{
 		struct pid_namespace *ns = acct->ns;
 
-		ac.ac_pid = task_tgid_nr_ns(current, ns);
+		ac->ac_pid = task_tgid_nr_ns(current, ns);
 		rcu_read_lock();
-		ac.ac_ppid = task_tgid_nr_ns(rcu_dereference(current->real_parent),
-					     ns);
+		ac->ac_ppid = task_tgid_nr_ns(rcu_dereference(current->real_parent), ns);
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 	}
 #endif
+}
+
+static void acct_write_process(struct bsd_acct_struct *acct)
+{
+	struct file *file = acct->file;
+	const struct cred *cred;
+	acct_t *ac = &acct->ac;
+
+	/* Perform file operations on behalf of whoever enabled accounting */
+	cred = override_creds(file->f_cred);
+
 	/*
-	 * Get freeze protection. If the fs is frozen, just skip the write
-	 * as we could deadlock the system otherwise.
+	 * First check to see if there is enough free_space to continue
+	 * the process accounting system. Then get freeze protection. If
+	 * the fs is frozen, just skip the write as we could deadlock
+	 * the system otherwise.
 	 */
-	if (file_start_write_trylock(file)) {
+	if (check_free_space(acct) && file_start_write_trylock(file)) {
 		/* it's been opened O_APPEND, so position is irrelevant */
 		loff_t pos = 0;
-		__kernel_write(file, &ac, sizeof(acct_t), &pos);
+		__kernel_write(file, ac, sizeof(acct_t), &pos);
 		file_end_write(file);
 	}
-out:
+
+	revert_creds(cred);
+}
+
+static void do_acct_process(struct bsd_acct_struct *acct)
+{
+	unsigned long flim;
+
+	/* Accounting records are not subject to resource limits. */
+	flim = rlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE);
+	current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur = RLIM_INFINITY;
+	fill_ac(acct);
+	acct_write_process(acct);
 	current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_FSIZE].rlim_cur = flim;
-	revert_creds(orig_cred);
 }
 
 /**