Merge tag 'asoc-v6.18' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/sound into for-next

ASoC: Updates for v6.18

A relatively quiet release for ASoC, we've had a lot of maintainance
work going on and several new drivers but really the most remarkable
thing is that we removed a driver, the WL1273 driver used in some old
Nokia systems that have had the underlying system support removed from
the kernel.

 - Morimoto-san continues his work on cleanups of the core APIs and
   enforcement of abstraction layers.
 - Lots of cleanups and conversions of DT bindings.
 - Substantial maintainance work on the Intel AVS drivers.
 - Support for Qualcomm Glymur and PM4125, Realtek RT1321, Shanghai
   FourSemi FS2104/5S, Texas Instruments PCM1754.
 - Remove support for TI WL1273.

Author: tiwai

.mailmap

@@ -589,6 +589,7 @@ Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> <nikolay@redhat.com>
 Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com>
 Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> <nikolay@nvidia.com>
 Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> <nikolay@isovalent.com>
+Nobuhiro Iwamatsu <nobuhiro.iwamatsu.x90@mail.toshiba> <nobuhiro1.iwamatsu@toshiba.co.jp>
 Odelu Kukatla <quic_okukatla@quicinc.com> <okukatla@codeaurora.org>
 Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@natalenko.name> <oleksandr@redhat.com>
 Oleksij Rempel <linux@rempel-privat.de> <bug-track@fisher-privat.net>

CREDITS

@@ -3222,6 +3222,10 @@ D: AIC5800 IEEE 1394, RAW I/O on 1394
 D: Starter of Linux1394 effort
 S: ask per mail for current address
 
+N: Boris Pismenny
+E: borisp@mellanox.com
+D: Kernel TLS implementation and offload support.
+
 N: Nicolas Pitre
 E: nico@fluxnic.net
 D: StrongARM SA1100 support integrator & hacker
@@ -4168,6 +4172,9 @@ S: 1513 Brewster Dr.
 S: Carrollton, TX 75010
 S: USA
 
+N: Dave Watson
+D: Kernel TLS implementation.
+
 N: Tim Waugh
 E: tim@cyberelk.net
 D: Co-architect of the parallel-port sharing system

Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu

@@ -586,6 +586,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsa
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/vmscape
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/attack_vector_controls.rst

@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ Spectre_v2            X                           X
 Spectre_v2_user                      X                           X            *       (Note 1)
 SRBDS                 X              X            X              X
 SRSO                  X              X            X              X
-SSB                                                                                   (Note 4)
+SSB                                  X
 TAA                   X              X            X              X            *       (Note 2)
 TSA                   X              X            X              X
 =============== ============== ============ ============= ============== ============ ========
@@ -229,9 +229,6 @@ Notes:
    3 --  Disables SMT if cross-thread mitigations are fully enabled, the CPU is
    vulnerable, and STIBP is not supported
 
-   4 --  Speculative store bypass is always enabled by default (no kernel
-   mitigation applied) unless overridden with spec_store_bypass_disable option
-
 When an attack-vector is disabled, all mitigations for the vulnerabilities
 listed in the above table are disabled, unless mitigation is required for a
 different enabled attack-vector or a mitigation is explicitly selected via a

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst

@@ -26,3 +26,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
    rsb
    old_microcode
    indirect-target-selection
+   vmscape

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/vmscape.rst

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+VMSCAPE
+=======
+
+VMSCAPE is a vulnerability that may allow a guest to influence the branch
+prediction in host userspace. It particularly affects hypervisors like QEMU.
+
+Even if a hypervisor may not have any sensitive data like disk encryption keys,
+guest-userspace may be able to attack the guest-kernel using the hypervisor as
+a confused deputy.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+The following CPU families are affected by VMSCAPE:
+
+**Intel processors:**
+  - Skylake generation (Parts without Enhanced-IBRS)
+  - Cascade Lake generation - (Parts affected by ITS guest/host separation)
+  - Alder Lake and newer (Parts affected by BHI)
+
+Note that, BHI affected parts that use BHB clearing software mitigation e.g.
+Icelake are not vulnerable to VMSCAPE.
+
+**AMD processors:**
+  - Zen series (families 0x17, 0x19, 0x1a)
+
+** Hygon processors:**
+ - Family 0x18
+
+Mitigation
+----------
+
+Conditional IBPB
+----------------
+
+Kernel tracks when a CPU has run a potentially malicious guest and issues an
+IBPB before the first exit to userspace after VM-exit. If userspace did not run
+between VM-exit and the next VM-entry, no IBPB is issued.
+
+Note that the existing userspace mitigation against Spectre-v2 is effective in
+protecting the userspace. They are insufficient to protect the userspace VMMs
+from a malicious guest. This is because Spectre-v2 mitigations are applied at
+context switch time, while the userspace VMM can run after a VM-exit without a
+context switch.
+
+Vulnerability enumeration and mitigation is not applied inside a guest. This is
+because nested hypervisors should already be deploying IBPB to isolate
+themselves from nested guests.
+
+SMT considerations
+------------------
+
+When Simultaneous Multi-Threading (SMT) is enabled, hypervisors can be
+vulnerable to cross-thread attacks. For complete protection against VMSCAPE
+attacks in SMT environments, STIBP should be enabled.
+
+The kernel will issue a warning if SMT is enabled without adequate STIBP
+protection. Warning is not issued when:
+
+- SMT is disabled
+- STIBP is enabled system-wide
+- Intel eIBRS is enabled (which implies STIBP protection)
+
+System information and options
+------------------------------
+
+The sysfs file showing VMSCAPE mitigation status is:
+
+  /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/vmscape
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+ * 'Not affected':
+
+   The processor is not vulnerable to VMSCAPE attacks.
+
+ * 'Vulnerable':
+
+   The processor is vulnerable and no mitigation has been applied.
+
+ * 'Mitigation: IBPB before exit to userspace':
+
+   Conditional IBPB mitigation is enabled. The kernel tracks when a CPU has
+   run a potentially malicious guest and issues an IBPB before the first
+   exit to userspace after VM-exit.
+
+ * 'Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT':
+
+   IBPB is issued on every VM-exit. This occurs when other mitigations like
+   RETBLEED or SRSO are already issuing IBPB on VM-exit.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+----------------------------------------------
+
+The mitigation can be controlled via the ``vmscape=`` command line parameter:
+
+ * ``vmscape=off``:
+
+   Disable the VMSCAPE mitigation.
+
+ * ``vmscape=ibpb``:
+
+   Enable conditional IBPB mitigation (default when CONFIG_MITIGATION_VMSCAPE=y).
+
+ * ``vmscape=force``:
+
+   Force vulnerability detection and mitigation even on processors that are
+   not known to be affected.

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -3829,6 +3829,7 @@
 					       srbds=off [X86,INTEL]
 					       ssbd=force-off [ARM64]
 					       tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
+					       vmscape=off [X86]
 
 				Exceptions:
 					       This does not have any effect on
@@ -8041,6 +8042,16 @@
 	vmpoff=		[KNL,S390] Perform z/VM CP command after power off.
 			Format: <command>
 
+	vmscape=	[X86] Controls mitigation for VMscape attacks.
+			VMscape attacks can leak information from a userspace
+			hypervisor to a guest via speculative side-channels.
+
+			off		- disable the mitigation
+			ibpb		- use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier
+					  (IBPB) mitigation (default)
+			force		- force vulnerability detection even on
+					  unaffected processors
+
 	vsyscall=	[X86-64,EARLY]
 			Controls the behavior of vsyscalls (i.e. calls to
 			fixed addresses of 0xffffffffff600x00 from legacy

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/display/msm/qcom,mdp5.yaml

@@ -60,7 +60,6 @@ properties:
           - const: bus
           - const: core
           - const: vsync
-          - const: lut
           - const: tbu
           - const: tbu_rt
         # MSM8996 has additional iommu clock

Documentation/devicetree/bindings/dma/qcom,bam-dma.yaml

@@ -92,8 +92,12 @@ required:
 anyOf:
   - required:
       - qcom,powered-remotely
+      - num-channels
+      - qcom,num-ees
   - required:
       - qcom,controlled-remotely
+      - num-channels
+      - qcom,num-ees
   - required:
       - clocks
       - clock-names