lsm: use lsm_prop in security_current_getsecid

Change the security_current_getsecid_subj() and
security_task_getsecid_obj() interfaces to fill in a lsm_prop structure
instead of a u32 secid.  Audit interfaces will need to collect all
possible security data for possible reporting.

Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

Author: cschaufler

include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h

@@ -235,9 +235,9 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_fix_setgroups, struct cred *new, const struct cred * old)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setpgid, struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getpgid, struct task_struct *p)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getsid, struct task_struct *p)
-LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, current_getsecid_subj, u32 *secid)
-LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid_obj,
-	 struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, current_getlsmprop_subj, struct lsm_prop *prop)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getlsmprop_obj,
+	 struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setnice, struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setioprio, struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getioprio, struct task_struct *p)

include/linux/security.h

@@ -507,8 +507,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
 int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
 int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
-void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid);
-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+void security_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop);
+void security_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop);
 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
 int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1305,14 +1305,15 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
+	lsmprop_init(prop);
 }
 
-static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+						struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
+	lsmprop_init(prop);
 }
 
 static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)

kernel/audit.c

@@ -2179,16 +2179,16 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
 
 int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 {
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 	char *ctx = NULL;
 	unsigned len;
 	int error;
-	u32 sid;
 
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
-	if (!sid)
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	if (!lsmprop_is_set(&prop))
 		return 0;
 
-	error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+	error = security_lsmprop_to_secctx(&prop, &ctx, &len);
 	if (error) {
 		if (error != -EINVAL)
 			goto error_path;
@@ -2405,8 +2405,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
 			audit_sig_uid = auid;
 		else
 			audit_sig_uid = uid;
-		/* scaffolding */
-		security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_sig_lsm.scaffold.secid);
+		security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&audit_sig_lsm);
 	}
 
 	return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);

kernel/auditfilter.c

@@ -1371,8 +1371,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 				if (f->lsm_rule) {
 					/* scaffolding */
-					security_current_getsecid_subj(
-							&prop.scaffold.secid);
+					security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
 					result = security_audit_rule_match(
 						   &prop, f->type, f->op,
 						   f->lsm_rule);

kernel/auditsc.c

@@ -470,7 +470,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 {
 	const struct cred *cred;
 	int i, need_sid = 1;
-	u32 sid;
 	struct lsm_prop prop = { };
 	unsigned int sessionid;
 
@@ -675,15 +674,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 					 * fork()/copy_process() in which case
 					 * the new @tsk creds are still a dup
 					 * of @current's creds so we can still
-					 * use security_current_getsecid_subj()
+					 * use
+					 * security_current_getlsmprop_subj()
 					 * here even though it always refs
 					 * @current's creds
 					 */
-					security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
+					security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
 					need_sid = 0;
 				}
-				/* scaffolding */
-				prop.scaffold.secid = sid;
 				result = security_audit_rule_match(&prop,
 								   f->type,
 								   f->op,
@@ -2730,12 +2728,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
 	context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
 	context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
 	context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
 	context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-	security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
+	security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &prop);
+	/* scaffolding */
+	context->target_sid = prop.scaffold.secid;
 	memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 }
 
@@ -2751,6 +2752,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
 	struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
 	struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
 	kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
 	if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
 		return 0;
@@ -2762,7 +2764,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
 		ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
 		ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
 		ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-		security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+		security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &prop);
+		/* scaffolding */
+		ctx->target_sid = prop.scaffold.secid;
 		memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -2783,7 +2787,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
 	axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
 	axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
 	axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-	security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+	security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &prop);
+	/* scaffolding */
+	axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = prop.scaffold.secid;
 	memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 	axp->pid_count++;
 

net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c

@@ -1534,11 +1534,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
 	int ret_val;
 	struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
 	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
 	/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
 	 * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
 	 * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info.secid);
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	/* scaffolding */
+	audit_info.secid = prop.scaffold.secid;
 	audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
 	audit_info.sessionid = 0;
 

net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h

@@ -32,7 +32,11 @@
  */
 static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info->secid);
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
+
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	/* scaffolding */
+	audit_info->secid = prop.scaffold.secid;
 	audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
 	audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
 }

security/apparmor/lsm.c

@@ -982,17 +982,24 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	return;
 }
 
-static void apparmor_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static void apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
 	struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
-	*secid = label->secid;
+
+	prop->apparmor.label = label;
+	/* scaffolding */
+	prop->scaffold.secid = label->secid;
 	__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
 }
 
-static void apparmor_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+					  struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
 	struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p);
-	*secid = label->secid;
+
+	prop->apparmor.label = label;
+	/* scaffolding */
+	prop->scaffold.secid = label->secid;
 	aa_put_label(label);
 }
 
@@ -1503,8 +1510,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, apparmor_current_getsecid_subj),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid_obj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj,
+		      apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, apparmor_userns_create),

security/integrity/ima/ima.h

@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}
 
 /* LIM API function definitions */
 int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
-		   const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
+		   const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, int mask,
 		   enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
 		   struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
 		   const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
@@ -400,8 +400,8 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
 int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
-		     const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
-		     int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+		     const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop,
+		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
 		     struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
 		     const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
 void ima_init_policy(void);

security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c

@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
  * @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated
  * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
- * @secid: secid of the task being validated
+ * @prop: properties of the task being validated
  * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
  *        MAY_APPEND)
  * @func: caller identifier
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  *
  */
 int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
-		   const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
+		   const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, int mask,
 		   enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
 		   struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
 		   const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos)
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
 
 	flags &= ima_policy_flag;
 
-	return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, cred, secid, func, mask,
+	return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, cred, prop, func, mask,
 				flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data,
 				allowed_algos);
 }